In this paper two-player Nash differential games, on an infinite time horizon, with two different information structures have been considered: the open loop and the deterministic feedback information structure. The performance indices were assumed to be of quadratic type and the constraint to be a linear positive differential system. As the main result, a convergent Newtonian algorithm to solve the associated algebraic matrix Riccati equation and generalized algebraic matrix Riccati equation in order to obtain stabilizing solutions which are directly related to the existence of a Nash equilibrium, is presented for each information structure. Finally, we discuss a numerical example to illustrate both algorithms presented.
Introduction
In the last decade, concepts of dynamic game theory received much attention. In economic processes and also in technical applications they are quite natural, since a real system is mostly influenced by several independently acting agents which try to optimize their particular performance.
One well known and simplest example is to model robust behavior of the system by a two-player game as disturbance attenuation in a control system. These systems have one controlling input but also an unknown input of disturbances. Here the controller tries to minimize the performance under the worst case assumption that the disturbance, as a second agent, tries to maximize it.
In this paper we contribute to another type of equilibrium concept, the Nash equilibrium and restrict our intentions to the dynamics of positive linear differential systems on an infinite time horizon (see Definition 1) . The performance criteria are assumed to be quadratic.
Naturally such systems arise in applications as populations in ecological systems or concentration of chemical reactants in chemical processes, just to mention a few [12] .
Although the notion of positivity relies on the underlying coordinate system (a change of coordinates can transform a nonpositive system into a positive one and vice versa), in practical applications the proper coordinates follow from the problem formulation.
In general we assume that the system dynamics is given by the linear differential equation
with matrices A 2 R nÂn , B i 2 R nÂm i for i ¼ 1, 2, and given dimensions n, m 1 , m 2 . The variable x is called the state of the game and the input function u i , i ¼ 1, 2, is called the control of player i.
Furthermore, for some r 2 N denote R r þ the cone of r-dimensional vectors with nonnegative coordinates. If we write C > 0 (C ! 0) for some matrix C 2 R nÂm this means that c ij > 0 (c ij ! 0) for all 1 i n and 1 j m. If a matrix C > 0, we call it positive and if C ! 0, we say that C is nonnegative, although this can be a bit misleading. Nonnegative here means that all elements of the considered matrix are nonnegative. In this spirit we use an elementwise order relation, i.e. C > D iff C À D > 0.
For real symmetric matrices we also define the cone of positive definite and positive semidefinite matrices by, respectively, A real square matrix A 2 R nÂn is called a Z-matrix if there exists s 2 R and C 2 R nÂn , C ! 0, such that A ¼ sI n À C, where I n denotes the n-dimensional unit matrix.
A Z-matrix A ¼ sI n À C is a monotonic matrix in the order cone R n þ called an M-matrix if s > ðCÞ, where : R nÂn ! R þ denotes the spectral radius of the matrix. If s ¼ then A is called a singular M-matrix.
We recall the following results on Z-matrices being M-matrices (see [4] [5] [6] and [25] Notice that from (ii) we can infer that if Av > 0 for some vector v 2 R n then v > 0. In this way we apply (ii) in the subsequent section. Furthermore we have from [14] . Theorem 2. Let A 2 R nÂn be an M-matrix. If the elements of B 2 R nÂn satisfy the relations b ii ! a ii , a ij b ij 0, i 6 ¼ j, i, j ¼ 1, . . . , n, then B is also an M-matrix.
Adapted from [12] , we define the following: Definition 1. Consider a linear system whose dynamics is described by (1) . This linear system is said to be positive if and only if for every nonnegative initial state and for every nonnegative input its state is nonnegative. From Refs [12] or [26] , we consider the following necessary and sufficient condition for positivity:
Theorem 3. System (1) is positive if and only if B 1 ! 0 and B 2 ! 0 and the matrix À A is a Z-matrix.
In this article, we aim to have a comprehensive study of Nash equilibria on positive systems, considering different information structures (see Ref. [3] ). In Section 2, we introduce the concept of open loop Nash equilibrium, provide conditions for the existence of left-right stabilizing solutions of the algebraic matrix Riccati equation appearing in the open loop Nash games and propose a Newton iteration to approximate the stabilizing solution. In Section 3, we introduce the concept of deterministic feedback Nash equilibrium and existence results for this type of equilibria are stated. We also discuss the existence of the stabilizing solution of the coupled system of generalized Riccati equations associated to deterministic feedback Nash equilibria. For the sake of simplicity, we restrict the representation to the two-player case. We slightly modify the presentation given in [7] , [19] and [20] , since in the case of a positive system it is natural for the players to try to maximize their performance instead of minimizing it, as it is the case in the cited articles.
Although the existing results on Nash equilibria, as referred to in the following two sections, hold for arbitrary linear systems (1) , in this work we restrict ourselves to positive systems. The reason will be revealed in the end of Section 3, since for this class of systems we obtain a Newton iteration procedure to approximate the stabilizing solution.
Open Loop Nash Equilibria on Infinite Time Horizon
To state the two-player game formulation on an infinite time horizon, with an open loop information structure, we start by introducing the ''quadratic'' performance criteria for the two players as:
where x is a solution of (1) and the matrices Q i 2 R nÂn and R ij 2 R m j Âm j are supposed to be symmetric for i, j ¼ 1, 2. In game theoretic terminology, an ''open loop'' strategy means that the players have to choose their strategies u 1 , u 2 prior to the game start and that their only information on the state of the game is the initial state x 0 . It is reasonable to assume A to be stable, since then any pair of controls (u 1 , u 2 ) with u i 2 L
where
and 
then the values of the performance indices at the equilibrium are
The standard solution method to calculate the solutions of the open loop Riccati equation is to use the relation of the solutions to certain invariant subspaces of a linear matrix operator defined by the coefficient matrices of the Riccati equation (see Refs [1, 2, 10] ). This method gives all solutions but clearly is numerically not efficient. On the other hand, we only need to know about the existence of one particular solution, namely, the left-right stabilizing one.
For an effective solution of the general algebraic open loop Nash Riccati equations, a Newton iterative scheme has been presented in Ref. [16] , although convergence could only be proved under rather restrictive conditions, i.e. for a rather specific class of games.
For the case of positive systems, we obtain a converging Newton process under quite natural conditions. For the block matrices in (3), we use the following notation:
then Eq. (3) can be rewritten as:
In order to define the Newton scheme for the Riccati algebraic Eq. (9), we define according to [18] :
The first Fre´chet derivative of R at a matrix K is a linear map ½RðKÞ 0 :
given by ½R 0 ðKÞðZÞ ¼ ÀðZðA À SKÞ þ ðD À KSÞZÞ:
From [15] we cite:
Theorem 5. For the positive system (1), suppose additionally that the matrix -A is an M-matrix. Assume for the matrices of the cost functionals (2) that Q ! 0 and S 0 (elementwise ordering). Assume further that there exists a matrix P, of appropriate size, such that RðPÞ > 0, then the Newton iteration sequence K i , i ¼ 0, 1, 2, 3, . . ., with
is well defined and converges monotonically to a solution K > 0. K is the smallest solution in the set of all nonnegative solutions, with respect to the elementwise ordering.
Also from Ref. [15] , we cite:
Under the assumptions of Theorem 5 and the additional requisite that A -SP and D -PS are M-matrices, the Newton sequence converges to a left-right stabilizing solution K of the Nash Riccati Eqs (3) and (9).
Remark 2. With the nonsingular matrices T :
Á we obtain a spectral factorization of the Nash-matrix
This reveals, together with the stability of A -SK and D -KS that H Nash has exactly n eigenvalues in the open left half plane and 2n in the open right half plane. In particular, this implies that K is the reverse dichotomic solution of the Nash algebraic Riccati equation (see [2] ). From the representation of solutions via H Nash -invariant n-dimensional subspaces of R 3n is also immediate that K is the unique stabilizing solution.
For the convenience of the reader, we summarize these results for open loop Nash equilibria on an infinite time horizon in the following theorem. ordering) . Furthermore, the standard algebraic Riccati Eq. (4) admit stabilizing solutions E i , i ¼ 1, 2, i.e. the matrices A À S 1 E 1 and A À S 2 E 2 are stable.
(iii) There exist matrices P 1 ! 0, P 2 ! 0 of appropriate size such that (in elementwise ordering) 
The state x and the controls u 
where X 1 , X 2 are solutions of the Lyapunov Eq. (7). (7) and (8) . &
Deterministic Feedback Nash Equilibria on Infinite Time Horizon
We start this section by introducing the concept of a Nash equilibrium in feedback information structure as it was given in [7] . To do this let F denote the following set of pairs of matrices:
where A i ¼ 1, 2 relates to Eq. (1), and define for any function x square integrable in [0, 1), with xðtÞ 2 R n and xð0Þ ¼ x 0 , the cost functionals for the players as:
where Q i and R ij are symmetric matrices of appropriate dimensions, and ÀR ii 2 S m i >0 .
Consider now the following equilibrium concept:
F is called a (two-player) deterministic feedback Nash equilibrium on the positive system (1) if the following inequalities hold:
for all initial states x 0 2 R n þ , all admissible strategies u 1 , u 2 , and for all ðF 1 
The deterministic feedback Nash equilibrium strategy then is
where x is a solution of the closed loop equation
The following result for existence of a feedback Nash was also obtained in [7] .
Theorem 7. Consider a two-player differential game, where the information structure of each player is of a feedback pattern, as given by (1) and (12), whose sought equilibrium concept follows Definition 4. Assume that the matrices Q i and R ij are symmetric and that ÀR ii 2 S m i >0 , for i, j ¼ 1, 2. Then, there exist deterministic feedback Nash equilibria if and only if there exist real symmetric n Â n matrices K 1 , K 2 , such that the following coupled system of generalized algebraic matrix Riccati equations
can be solved and the closed loop matrix
If these conditions hold, the tuple (F
is a deterministic feedback Nash equilibrium and
Linear Quadratic Nash Games on Positive Linear Systems
It was first shown in [24, pp. 190-193] , that these conditions are sufficient to fulfill the necessary conditions for a feedback Nash equilibrium.
Similarly to the open loop case, we now describe a Newton scheme to solve the coupled system (14) . For this type of generalized coupled algebraic Riccati equations, a relation of solutions to invariant subspaces of a linear operator is not known. Hence, from the discussion of the solvability problem for feedback (closed loop) Nash Riccati equations in [2, p. 333 ff.], a general approach seems to be much harder than in the open loop case (see also Ref. [13] ). Based on the eigenstructure of a certain matrix, Engwerda in [9] and [11] proposes a numerical algorithm to calculate the solutions of a set of scalar coupled feedback Nash algebraic Riccati equations in a linear-quadratic differential game with infinite time horizon, permitting in this manner the analysis of the equilibrium points.
To calculate an approximation to a stabilizing solution of (14), we define the Newton recursion for that system. Analogously to Definition 3, the Fre´chet derivative of
is defined as [18] :
With this, we obtain the Newton iteration scheme:
which can be rewritten in two separated equations as:
and
Theorem 8. Suppose that the following conditions hold:
wise ordering). (iv) There exists matrices P 1 ! 0, P 2 ! 0 of appropriate size such that
(in the elementwise ordering).
Then the Newton sequence
, as defined by Eqs (19) and (20) and initialized with K (14) and
Furthermore, if the Z-matrix ÀA þ S 1 P 1 þ S 2 P 2 is an M-matrix then the closed loop matrix
Proof. For i ¼ 0 in (19) and (20) 
Using the Kronecker product (see Ref. [22] for Kronecker product definition and properties), we define:
and Eqs (21) can be rewritten as:
and I n is the n-dimensional unit matrix.
Since ÀA is an M-matrix the matrices Ã
Let us now assume that this is true for k ¼ 0, 1, . . . , i.
The next steps are to prove that, under these assumptions, the statement is also true for i þ 1. Then by mathematical induction we conclude that it holds for all indices k. In the first step we prove (ii) of the statement.
With the matrices P 1 , P 2 such that R 1 ðP 1 , P 2 Þ > 0, R 2 ðP 1 , P 2 Þ > 0, together with (14), (19), we obtain:
and analogously with (14) and (20)
Inequalities (24) and (25) can now be written equivalently as
With the notation (23) this is
Since Ã i is an M-matrix then, since S 1 0, S 2 0, and S 12 , S 21 ! 0 with Theorem 1, (ii), we conclude K iþ1
In the second step we prove that ÃðK
is an M-matrix. For doing that, we first need two auxiliar identities.
Using (19) we obtain after a short calculation
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With these identities we now prove that Ã iþ1 is an M-matrix. Together with (14), (28) and condition (iv) in Theorem 8 we obtain after a short calculation the following inequalities:
and with (29) we obtain the second inequality
From inequalities (30) and (31), together with the assumptions S 1 , S 2 0 and S 12 , S 21 ! 0, we conclude first
Moreover, from our monotonicity assumption in the induction statement we get K iþ1 1 , K iþ1 2 ! 0, therefore Ã iþ1 is a Z-matrix. Since we already have proved
In the last step we now prove monotonicity. With (19) and (28) we obtain again after a short calculation
and analogously, with (20) , (29)
From these inequalities we obtain as before the inequality
Since we proved already that Ã iþ1 is an M-matrix we infer together with Theorem 1, (ii), the monotonicity K iþ1
2 . We have thus proved that our induction assumptions in the statement are also true for k ¼ i þ 1, hence for all k ! 0.
As the Newton sequences K k 1 , K k 2 are monotonically increasing and bounded by P 1 , P 2 , respectively, they are convergent. Assume that lim k!1 K
Then by construction of the Newton sequences, K 1 ! 0, K 2 ! 0 are solutions of (14) . This proves the first part of the theorem.
Let us now assume that P 1 , P 2 are such that ÀA þ S 1 P 1 þ S 2 P 2 is an M-matrix. Then, since S 1 0, S 2 0, and
With Theorem 2 we obtain that ÀA þ S 1 K 1 þ S 2 K 2 is an M-matrix too and Theorem 1, (iv), finally ensures the stability of A À S 1 K 1 À S 2 K 2 . From the definition of the iteration sequences (19) , (20) and (21) (14) such that
Proof. Similar to the calculations in (30) 
Assume now that it exist solutions with K
Hence, together with the other assumptions we obtain from (34) and (35) the inequality
is an M-matrix we infer that the solutions
of the closed loop equation in Definition 4 are nonnegative, i.e. xðtÞ! 0, if x 0 ! 0. Hence, B i u Remark 4. Notice, moreover, that with these solutions K 1 , K 2 , we obtain deterministic feedback Nash equilibrium controls as given in Definition 4 and Theorem 7 by
This yields indeed nonnegative controls if instead of
Finally, we summarize all these results obtained for the deterministic feedback Nash equilibrium on positive systems with infinite time horizon. (iii) There exists matrices P 1 ! 0, P 2 ! 0 of appropriate size such that (in elementwise ordering)
and, furthermore, ÀA þ S 1 P 1 þ S 2 P 2 (where S 1 , S 2 as defined in Theorem 7) is an M-matrix.
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Then there exists a deterministic feedback Nash equilibrium with the equilibrium controls defined on [0, 1)
where K 1 , K 2 are the solutions of the generalized algebraic Riccati Eqs (14) , given by Theorem 8, and x(t) is the solution of the closed loop equation
Proof. Since R À1 ii 0 and B i ! 0, we infer from Theorem 8 the existence of symmetric and nonnegative solutions K 1 , K 2 of the coupled generalized Riccati algebraic matrix Eqs (14) such that 
Numerical Example
From Theorem 6 and Theorem 9, we obtain, respectively, an iterative algorithm to calculate the Nash equilibrium for the open loop and the deterministic feedback information structure. Hence:
Algorithm (Open loop case):
Assumptions: -In (1) given ÀA 2 R nÂn such that ÀA is an M-matrix and B i 2 R nÂm i with B i ! 0, i ¼ 1, 2, (in elementwise ordering). Calculations: -There exists the solution of (4), E i , i ¼ 1, 2, such that matrices A À S 1 E 1 and A À S 2 E 2 are stable.
are stable.
-Calculate the state vector using (6).
-Calculate the control vector using (5).
-Calculate X 1 and X 2 from (7).
-Calculate the values of the cost functionals at the equilibrium using (8) .
The solvability of (3) together with (4) is sufficient for the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium. Notice that if the calculated sequence K k converges monotonically then it is not necessary to find a matrix P ¼ ð
Þ such that RðPÞ > 0. This was only needed in the proof to ensure boundedness of the sequence K k .
Algorithm (Deterministic feedback case):
Assumptions: -In (1) given ÀA 2 R nÂn such that ÀA is an M-matrix and B i 2 R nÂm i with
>0 , and R À1 ii 0, i ¼ 1, 2 (in elementwise ordering), and S ij ! 0, i, j ¼ 1, 2, i 6 ¼ j (in elementwise ordering), where S ij as in Theorem 7.
-Given "> 0, a precision bound.
Calculations: -While kK (19) and (20) and set
-Calculate the state vector using (38).
-Calculate the control vector using (37).
-Calculate the values of the cost functionals at the equilibrium using (39). is not necessary to find matrices P i with the demanded properties. These two algorithms are applied on a four dimension example. For every information structure, the norm of the state trajectory, and the vector equilibrium strategies, for every player, are plotted (Fig. 1) .
Example: We consider a 4D example and accordingly define adequate matrices to obtain a positive system: The coefficients of the associated functionals for both players are defined as: Notice that in this example we need not calculate explicitly E 1 , E 2 . The associated hamiltonian matrices to the standard Riccati Eqs (4) do not have eigenvalues on the imaginary axes (check by direct calculation). From Theorem 2.3.1 in [2] together with the controllability of ðA, ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
, we infer that all symmetric solutions exist, in particular both dichotomic solutions (see Remark 3.3.14 (vii) in [2] ). Furthermore, if the reverse dichotomic solutions For the same problem, the feedback Newton sequence is also well defined and converges to the symmetric solution: 
Conclusions
By Newton's method, we have obtained an iterative algorithm for solving open loop Nash algebraic matrix Riccati equations and generalized algebraic matrix Riccati Eqs (3), (14) and (10), for a two-player game on an infinite time horizon. As a result, we get a monotonically (in the elementwise ordering) converging sequence towards a positive solution, stabilizing therefore the system. The initial matrix for the algorithm can be determined by solving a linear Lyapunov equation. The performance of the algorithm is shown in a four dimension example.
To solve a standard algebraic Riccati equation, there are known recursive schema like Kleinman's algorithm which indeed is a Newton algorithm.
For non-symmetric algebraic Riccati equations, iterative solutions have been proposed for the first time in [14] . All these algebraic Riccati equations can also be solved by calculating invariant subspaces of an associated matrix (a hamiltonian matrix in the case of standard algebraic Riccati equations). But, this method is not effective if one is interested only in a stabilizing solution. Generalized algebraic Riccati equations, as they appear for instance in jump linear systems with Markovian jumping parameters, typically are of standard type with a linear perturbation. Hence, no solution method by invariant subspaces is available. For this type of system, several algorithms have been proposed (see [2, p. 394 ] and the literature cited therein). The convergence proof mainly relies on the symmetry of the equations which allows the application of comparison results for symmetric equations.
For the generalized algebraic Riccati equations of our type, where a quadratic perturbation of open loop Nash algebraic Riccati equation appears, some Newton algorithms have been proposed (see [2, p. 333] ), but to the best of our knowledge no convergence proof has been presented so far. In Theorem 8, we present for the first time an algorithm to calculate ''the'' solution of Eqs (14) which is needed to solve the deterministic feedback Nash problem.
Moreover, it is explained how these particular solutions are related with the existence and uniqueness of an open loop and a deterministic feedback Nash equilibrium in a two-player differential game, where the performance index is of quadratic type and the system dynamics is given by a linear positive system of differential equations. Furthermore, we briefly indicated where such systems can appear in practical applications. The performance of the feedback algorithm is illustrated with the same example used in the open loop algorithm.
